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I. Introduction
With the recent rush of foreign investors attempting to establish
business ties with emerging markets such as the People's Republic of
China (PRC),' U.S. companies are becoming concerned with their po-
tential exposure under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).2
The FCPA, which applies to both U.S. corporations and individuals,3
contains an antibribery provision which makes bribery of foreign gov-
ernment officials to obtain or retain business a criminal offense.4 The
Act also contains an accounting provision which deals with record-
1. U.S. direct investment in China increased from around $300 million in 1990 to
$500 million in 1992. Foreign Direct Investment: Hearing Before the Joint Economic
Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1992) (statement of Stephen Cooney, Director, Interna-
tional Investment, National Association of Manufacturers).
2. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was enacted through amendments to the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934. Consequently, the provisions are scattered in the United
States Code. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-note, 78dd-1, -2, and 78ff (1988).
3. The FCPA applies to "domestic concerns" and "issuers" of some classes of securi-
ties. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a). "Domestic concerns" is defined as citizens, residents,
and any corporations, partnerships, associations, join-stock companies, business trusts, un-
incorporated organizations, and sole proprietorships which are incorporated or conducting
business in the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1). Practically, this definition subjects
everyone in the United States to the Act.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, -2.
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keeping and accounting practices of issuers.5 Both the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the SEC have authority to enforce the Act,
although the DOJ has sole authority for criminal prosecutions.6 By
way of providing a context for later discussion, Part I of this Note will
briefly lay out the elements, defenses, and penalties under the FCPA.
U.S. companies that are active in China as well as in other devel-
oping countries find themselves increasingly at risk to FCPA expo-
sure.7 Of particular concern are the increasingly severe penalties
imposed by the Act.' Another concern is the potential personal liabil-
ity to high-ranking officers and employees of these companies.9
Moreover, corporations with many foreign subsidiaries or joint ven-
tures in the emerging markets find themselves in a predicament when
the U.S. parent company or the U.S. partner in a foreign joint venture
lacks adequate control over or information regarding its foreign
branches' activities in these emerging markets, where established legal
norms are lacking and bribery is an accepted way of doing business.
The concerns noted above are keenly felt in the context of trans-
acting business in the PRC because of several unique factors in that
business environment.10 Part II of this Note will examine these pecu-
liar factors which increase the risk of FCPA exposure. Of these fac-
tors, the most significant is the popular joint venture arrangement, the
Chinese government's preferred vehicle for utilizing foreign invest-
ments. Other factors include rampant corruption and China's efforts
to reform a planned economy into a market economy.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a), (b). "Issuers" are companies that have to register certain
classes of stocks with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Id.
6. 15 U.S.C. H8 78dd-l(d), 7Sff(b), (c).
7. See Lucinda Home, U.S. Corruption Laws "Hurt" Firns in China, S. CtNA
MORNNG POsT, Nov. 11, 1992, at 1, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, SChina File.
8. For instance, in 1995 a high-profile defense company was fined $24.S million for
violating the FCPA. That fine was twice the amount of the company's profits from the sale
of planes to the foreign country. $24.8 Million Penalty Paid by Lockheed, N.Y. TitEs, Jan.
28, 1995, at 35. Moreover, FCPA fines and penalties are expected to increase because of
mandatory federal sentencing guidelines. William F. Pendergast, Foreign Cornrpt Practices
Act An Overview of Almost Twenty Years of Foreign Bribery Prosecutions, in 1 Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Rep. (Business Laws, Inc.) 102.001, 102.015 (July 1995).
9. The FCPA permits imposition of penalties for violations on a company's officers
and employees. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2). Moreover, an individual who is an officer, direc-
tor, or employee of a company that is an issuer may not be indemnified by the company for
the FCPA fine. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(3).
10. See Home, supra note 7. The statute was considered "impractical, unrealistic and
difficult to interpret in the context of doing business with China, where U.S. competitors
were free to make payments to officials to facilitate transactions, whether illegal or legal."
Id.
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Despite the factors which increase the risk of FCPA exposure,
there are preventive measures which U.S. companies active in the
PRC can institute to assure FCPA compliance and minimize potential
liability under the Act. Part III of this Note discusses various meas-
ures U.S. businesses in China can implement to protect themselves
from exposure to the FCPA. These measures are roughly divided into
two main categories. First, U.S. businesses may formulate internal
measures to ensure FCPA compliance. Second, as a matter of long-
term business strategy, U.S. corporations and individuals may employ
practical tactics in order to minimize their exposure to certain corrupt
practices prevalent in China.
H. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
A. Background and Scope of the Act
Enacted in 1977, the FCPA was a public response to the Water-
gate and Lockheed scandals, which involved extensive government
and business corruption. 1 SEC investigations revealed that 117 For-
tune 500 companies paid substantial bribes to foreign governments,
some of which amounted to tens of millions of dollars.' 2 As a result,
Congress enacted the FCPA as an amendment to the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.13 The FCPA itself was later amended in re-
sponse to criticisms regarding its practicality.'
4
The Act contains three main sections: (1) an antibribery provi-
sion,15 (2) an accounting provision,' 6 and (3) a penalty provision.'7
11. On the Take, ECONOMisT, Nov. 19, 1988, at 21. In 1975 the aircraft manufacturer
Lockheed admitted that it had paid $22 million in bribes since 1970. The Lockheed scandal
and the Watergate hearings brought about an antibribery mood among the public. In re-
sponse, Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977. Id.
12. HousE Co0M1M. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPO,
RATE PAYMENTS Acr OF 1977, H.R. RE'. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977). Exxon
admitted to the largest payment ($56.7 million), followed by Northrop ($30.7 million), and
Lockheed ($25 million). John Impert, A Program for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 INT'L LAW. 1009,
1010 (1990); Christopher L. Hall, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Competitive Disad-
vantage, But for How Long?, 2 TuL. J. INT'L & CoNir. L. 289, 293 (1994).
13. Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is To Be Done with the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act? 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431, 433 (1987).
14. Due to the perceived uncertainty and impracticality of the original prohibitions,
the Act was amended in 1988 as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. The
pre-1988 objective "reason to know" standard was changed to a more narrow and subjec-
tive "knowing" standard. See Impert, supra note 12, at 1013-14; Hall, supra note 12, at 297-
99.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, -2.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a), (b).
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The antibribery provision is applicable to both "domestic concerns"
and "SEC reporting companies" or "issuers.""' The accounting provi-
sion, on the other hand, only applies to SEC reporting companies (i.e..
issuers). 19 In addition, officers, directors, stockholders, agents. or em-
ployees of a company subject to the FCPA are individually subject to
the statute.'0 Foreign officials, however, are not liable under the
FCPA as bribe recipients.2 The antibribery provision itself is ambigu-
ous as to whether foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations and foreign
joint ventures in which a U.S. business is a partner are liable. How-
ever, liability may attach if the relationship between the U.S. parent
and its subsidiary are sufficiently close.
22
B. The Elements of FCPA Violations and Applicable Defenses
1. Antibribery Provision
A violation of the antibribery provision includes five elements?2
The FCPA makes it a criminal offense if any domestic concern:
(1) makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce;
(2) corruptly in furtherance of an offer, gift, payment, promise to
pay, or authorization of the payment of any money or anything of
value;
(3) to any "foreign official,"24 foreign political party, foreign polit-
ical party official or candidates for office (collectively, "foreign re-
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)-(c).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, -2. "SEC reporting companies" are those with a class of s2-
curities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act f 1933. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-l(a). The definition of domestic concerns, in contrast, is more expansive bacazise it
includes any individuals, citizens, residents of the United States and any business entity
which is incorporated or conducting business principally in the United States. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78dd-2 (h) (1).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 7Sff(c)(2)(B), (C).
21. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir. 1990).
22. See S. Gregory Joy, Application of Selected American Laws to United States Com-
panies Transacting Business in Kuwait: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Anti-boycott
Legislation. 43 MERCER L. REv. 691, 694 (1992).
23. Arthur Aronoff, The Commerce Department Speaks on International Trade and
Investment 1994, Antibribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Ppa'rcjri,
LAw INSmT'U', CORP. LAW Am Pnp.cnc- COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, Ot. 1994, avail.
able in WL, PLI Database.
24. A "foreign official" is "any officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capac-
ity . . . ." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1), -2(h)(2). The word "instrumentality" effectively
makes the definition of a foreign official extremely broad. Although -instrumentality of a
foreign government" is not defined in the FCPA, it is defined in the Foreign Sovereign
1996]
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cipient"), or to any person while "knowing" that all or a part of the
thing of value will be offered to a foreign recipient;
(4) for the purpose of influencing any official act or decision or in-
ducing the foreign recipient to act in violation of his lawful duty, or
induce such recipient to use his influence with a foreign government
or instrumentality to affect any decision of that government or
instrumentality;
(5) in order to assist the public company or domestic concern in
obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to,
any person.25
In short, the antibribery provision of the FCPA primarily prohibits
American businesses from (1) using interstate commerce (2) to cor-
ruptly pay (3) foreign officials (4) for the purpose of influencing an
official act (5) in order to obtain or retain business.
The antibribery provision exempts certain payments, including
any payment made to facilitate or expedite the performance of "rou-
tine governmental actions" by a foreign official. 6 "Routine govern-
ment actions" are broadly defined as common bureaucratic tasks such
as: (1) obtaining permits and licenses; (2) processing visas, work or-
ders, and government papers; (3) providing police protection, mail
services, or scheduling inspections; or (4) providing utility services
such as phone, power, and water supply.27 This list is not exhaustive-
any "actions of similar nature" also fall under this exception.28 To
date, no court has interpreted the application of this routine govern-
mental action exception.
In addition to the exempted payments provision, two affirmative
defenses are available to defend a bribery charge under the Act. First,
the payment is allowed if such payment is lawful under the written
Immunities Act as commercial enterprises which are more than 50% owned by a foreign
government. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), (b) (1994).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a). This fifth element is commonly known as the "busi-
ness purpose" test. The business obtained or retained does not have to be with a foreign
government to satisfy the business purpose test. Aronoff, supra note 23.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), -2(b). This exception is also known as the "grease pay-
ments" exception. The pre-1988 Act, in contrast, sought to permit facilitating or grease
payments by classifying such payments according to the status of the payee. If payments
were made to a foreign official whose duties were "ministerial" or "clerical," then they
would come under the exception. Consequently, payments made to a foreign official
whose duties rose to the level of decision-making were prohibited. This distinction of offi-
cial duties caused much confusion. As a result, the post-1988 Act changed the focus from
the status of the payee to the purpose for which payment was made. Impert, supra note 12,
at 1015.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3), -2(h)(4).
28. Id.
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laws and regulations of the foreign official's country2 9 Second, the
payment is legal if made as a reasonable or bona fide expenditure
which directly relates to: (1) promotion, demonstration, or explana-
tion of products, or (2) execution or performance of a contract with a
foreign government or agency.30 Paying the travel and lodging costs
on behalf of a foreign official would fall under this category if the
elements of this defense are met. To date, however, as in the case of
the exempted payments provision, these two affirmative defenses
have not been raised by any defendants. 31
2. Accounting Provision
The accounting provision, codified at 15 U.S.C. section 78m(b),
complements the antibribery provision. The accounting provision at-
tempts to frustrate a corporation's efforts to escape detection of brib-
ery through maintaining off-the-books cash accounts used to make
questionable payments, or slush funds.-" The accounting provision,
therefore, requires any corporation which has certain classes of shares
registered with the SEC to:
(1) make and keep books, records and accounts, which, in reason-
able detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and disposi-
tions of the assets of the company: and
(2) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls suf-
ficient to provide reasonable assurances.33 such that the following
objectives are satisfied: (a) corporate assets and transactions are
safeguarded from unauthorized use; (b) corporate transactions con-
form to managerial authorizations: and (c) corporate records are
accurate.
34
Of particular interest are the standards of "reasonable detail" and
"reasonable assurance." These two terms are defined in the Act as
the "level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent
officials in the conduct of their own affairs. '"' s To clarify this "prudent
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-i(c)(1), -2(c)(1). However, no nation would permit bribery
under the law. Pendergast, supra note 8, at 102.004.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), -2(c)(2).
31. Pendergast, supra note 8, at 102.004.
32. SEcuRrrIEs AND EXCHANGE COMM'N REPORT, 94TH CONG.. 2D SESS., REPORT ON
QuEoNALE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACricEs 23. 24 (Comm.
Print 1976).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 7Sm(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
34. SEC Chairman Harold Williams, Address Before the SEC Developments Confer-
ence of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Jan. 29, 1981) mn 46 Fed.
Reg. 11544, 11546-47 (1981) [hereinafter SEC Chairman Address].
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7).
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officials" standard, the SEC has emphasized that the standard of rea-
sonableness is meant to allow "flexibility in responding to particular
facts and circumstances." 36 Accordingly, a materiality standard 7 is in-
appropriate to determine either the accuracy of corporate records or
the effectiveness of internal corporate control.38 While materiality is
suitable as a threshold to determine the need for disclosure, the SEC
views materiality as an inappropriate and inadequate standard for an
internal control system.39
Where the U.S. parent company does not have a majority owner-
ship interest in its subsidiaries or affiliates, the accounting provision
provides a good faith safe harbor for the foreign subsidiaries or affili-
ates of the SEC reporting companies.40 When a U.S. issuer holds a
minority of the voting shares of its foreign subsidiary, compliance with
the accounting provision is presumed so long as the U.S. parent com-
pany demonstrates a good faith effort to use its influence to cause its
subsidiary to comply with the Act's accounting and record-keeping
requirements.4' The good faith effort must be reasonable under the
circumstances.42 The relevant "circumstances" to find reasonableness
include: (1) the relative degree of the issuer's ownership, and (2) the
laws and practices governing the business operations of the country
where the subsidiary is located.43 Therefore, it can be inferred that
where the U.S. parent company is the majority holder of its subsidi-
ary's voting shares, strict compliance with the accounting provisions is
expected.
Finally, the Act contains a limited national security exemption
from compliance with the accounting provision." No duty or liability
will be imposed upon any person acting in cooperation with the head
of any federal department or agency responsible for matters concern-
ing national security of the United States, so long as the person acted
36. SEC Chairman Address, supra note 34, at 11,546.
37. The materiality standard is applicable to SEC disclosure requirements. SEC Rules
13(b)(2)-1 and 13(b)(2)-2 identify the prohibited accounting procedures. These rules pro-
vide that no issuer shall falsify any record or account in order to produce a materially false
statement or to omit any material fact. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1, -2 (1995).
38. SEC Chairman Address, supra note 34, at 11,546.
39. IM. For instance, in a large public company, only a questionable payment in the
neighborhood of millions of dollars would be material. However, that figure is unaccept-
able as a threshold amount for the SEC. Id.




44. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(3)(A).
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upon a specific written directive 45 This exemption has very limited
application. The executive directive must be authorized by the Presi-
dent and expires after one year.'
C. FCPA Penalties
1. Antibribery Provision
Both criminal and civil penalties for violations of the antibribery
provision are severe. Criminal penalties can reach a maximum of $2
million in fines for issuers and domestic concerns. 7 $100,000 for indi-
viduals, corporate officers, directors, employees, agents, or stockhold-
ers who commit a willful violation,' s and a maximum of five years
imprisonment for corporate officers, directors, employees, agents, or
stockbrokers who commit willful violations.4 9 Corporate employers
cannot indemnify individual corporate employees for FCPA fines.-"
With regard to civil penalties, a maximum of $10,000 can be levied
against any company found to be liable and on any employee, officer,
director, or agent who commits a willful violation.51 In addition, in-
junctive relief is available to prevent a violation. 2
2. Accounting Provision
As with the antibribery penalties, the accounting provision penal-
ties are also substantial. Violations can result in a maximum fine of
$2.5 million for companies or a maximum ten years imprisonment for
individuals.53 However, criminal penalties are limited to "knowing"
falsification of records and circumvention of internal controls. 4
D. Joint Enforcement of the FCPA by the SEC and the DOJ
The SEC and the DOJ share responsibility for investigation and
enforcement of the FCPA antibribery provision. s The SEC seeks in-
junctions on civil violations by SEC reporting companies and any re-
45. Id
46. Id.
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), 7Sff(c)(1)(A).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), (B), 78ff(c)(2)(A), (B).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), (B).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(3).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), 78dd-2(g)(2)(C), 7Sff(c)(1)(B), (2)(C).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(1).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)-(c).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4), (5).
55. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(d), 78ff(b), (c); see also Impert, supra note 12, at 1012.
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lated individuals.56 The Department of Justice has similar authority
for civil violations by domestic concerns,5 7 however it alone is respon-
sible for criminal prosecutions of antibribery violations by both re-
porting companies and domestic concerns.58
With respect to the accounting provision, the SEC is responsible
for the civil enforcement of accounting and reporting violations.5 9
The DOJ has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions.
60
III. Unique Conditions in the PRC: U.S. Entities are
Increasingly Exposed to the FCPA
A. Nature of U.S. Business Activities in China: Joint Ventures,
Export Sales, and Competitive Business Environment
U.S. commercial arrangements in China primarily consist of two
types:61 export sales arrangements 62 and U.S. direct investment in
China.63 Both categories enjoyed steady growth in recent years as
China's economy boomed. For instance, U.S. exports to China in-
creased by 19% in the first half of 1993,6 and U.S. direct investment
56. Notification of Enactment of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 14,478, 1978 SEC LEXIS 2210, at *5-8, (Feb. 6, 1978) (SEC can conduct civil
enforcement in the form of investigation, bring civil injunction and administrative proceed-
ings, and refer cases to the DOJ for criminal prosecutions). It should be noted that the
SEC pursues civil enforcement only with reporting companies, but not with domestic con-
cerns. Id. at *8-9; 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1994).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(d) (allowing the Attorney General to bring a suit for injunctive
relief in federal district court).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (a)-(c); see also Mark R. Wysocki, Foreign Corrupt Practices
Ac4 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 587, 595 (1987).
59. Wysocki, supra note 58, at 593; see also S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3
(1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4109 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
60. See Wysocki, supra note 58, at 593. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at
4109-10.
61. See generally JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., 2 CHINA'S Eco.
NOMIC DILEMMAS IN THE 1990s: THE PROBLEMS OF REFORMS, MODERNIZATION, AND
INTERDEPENDENCE 897-99 (Jt. Comm. Print 1991).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Global Economic and Technological Change: Former Soviet Union and Central
and Eastern Europe, and China. Hearings Before the Joint Economic Comm., 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 116 (1993) (paper submitted by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee) [hereinafter Congress J Economic Comm. Rep.].
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in China increased from about $300 million in 19906s to around S500
million in 1992.66
Amidst China's economic growth,67 both U.S. export sales and
direct investments are prone to FCPA exposure. Both sectors require
reliance on intermediaries (e.g., agents) or the formation of partner-
ships with local entities to obtain or carry on business. FCPA liability
through third party conduct attaches easily as a result of the Act's
broad intent of regulating U.S. corporate behavior abroad.
First, in export sales, a U.S. exporter either has to use its own
employees or engage the services of a foreign sales agent. whose activ-
ities will also be under the purview of the FCPA. While the U.S. ex-
porter's own employees, if they are U.S. citizens or residents subject
to the FCPA, are less likely to violate the Act,.5' the foreign sales
agent's conduct or practices may create FCPA exposure to the U.S.
exporter. Many agents are unaware of the Act, and bribery in some
places is a customary way of doing business.
Although U.S. businesses involved with export sales may be hesi-
tant to make illegal payments themselves, their agents may not be as
timid. As a result, U.S. businesses cannot merely require their hired
agents to sign a "no-bribery promise," and then "clos[e] their eyes to
whatever those agents do-including how they spend their commis-
sions.169 Corporations have reason to be wary. Under the antibribery
provision, the requisite knowledge element is satisfied when the busi-
ness "is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circum-
stance [that bribery has occurred]. 70 The DOJ directly asks whether
65. Foreign Direct Investment: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm.. 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1992) (statement of Stephen Cooney. Director. International Invest-
ment, National Association of Manufactures presented to the joint committee) [hereinafter
Hearing on Foreign Direct Investment].
66. Congress Jt Economic Comm. Rep., supra note 64. at 118,
67. Id. Experts predict that China will overtake the United States to become the
world's top investment destination by the end of the century. Currently, it is ranked s.c -
ond only to the United States in the amount of direct foreign investment attracted. The
United States attracted $30 billion in direct foreign investment in 1993 %xhilN China at-
tracted $26 billion. China's direct foreign investment wvas estimated at $35 billion in 1994.
China Set to be Top Investment Destination, RErTER Bus. REP., Oct. 26. 1994, at 1. avail.
able in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Rebus File. In foreign trade, China ranked l1th in the
world for its trade volume in 1992, and its trade sector is expected to grow. See Congress
Jt Economic Comm. Rep., supra note 64, at 115.
68. Impert, supra note 12, at 1022.
69. Barbara Ettore, Why Overseas Bribery Won't Last, MorGr. RE%,., June 1994, at 20;
See also Pendergast, supra note 8, at 102.003.
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(g)(3), -2(h)(3).
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the U.S. exporter had knowledge that the intermediary would use the
sales commission to bribe a foreign official.7'
Second, FCPA exposure increases when U.S. direct investments
in China take the form of joint ventures. Such ventures with state-
owned enterprises are the Chinese authorities' preferred mode of eco-
nomic cooperation with foreign investors.72 Only recently did China
abolish its prohibitions against foreign majority ownership in joint
ventures.73 Against this context, and since most U.S. direct invest-
ment in China is in equity joint ventures with state enterprises,74 the
lack of control of the business operations poses problems with FCPA
compliance.
The danger of exposure to the antibribery provision of the Act in
the joint venture setting is particularly grave when the U.S. party is
the minority partner. While minority partners in U.S.-Chinese joint
ventures are afforded the good faith/due diligence safe harbor in the
accounting provision,' they may nonetheless be subject to the an-
tibribery provision, which is very nebulous on the threshold question
of liability.76
Liability under the antibribery provision is not ascribed based on
clear-cut ownership or degree of control but on "knowledge" pos-
sessed by the U.S. parent company.77 The Act requires the compli-
ance of third parties if a U.S. company "knows" that the intermediary
71. Pendergast, supra note 8, at 102.003.
72. Joint ventures are the main vehicle for direct foreign investment in China. There
are basically four types of direct foreign investments in the PRC: equity joint ventures,
cooperative operations, wholly-owned ventures, and cooperative development ventures.
See KHAN, WORLD BANK DIscussIoN PAPERS, CHINA AND MONGOLIAN DEPARTMENT
SERIES: PATERNS OF DIREcr FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA 36-38 (1991).
73. Congress At. Economic Comm. Rep., supra note 64, at 120.
74. Equity joint ventures are the most popular of the four, accounting for 49% of the
total contracted foreign direct investment in 1989. Cooperative operations comprise 41%
of that total. Wholly-owned ventures with full control by foreign companies are the least
popular, accounting for only 6.8% of the total contracted direct foreign investment in 1989,
largely because Chinese authority did not consider this method of foreign investment as
useful in contributing to the transfer of technology and management skills. Khan, supra
note 72.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6). So long as the U.S. issuer reasonably and in good faith uses
its influence to make its subsidiary keep accurate records and maintain a system of internal
controls, the U.S. parent company will have no legal responsibility for any FCPA account-
ing provisions violations. Id.
76. See Norman Givant, The Sword that Shields, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Protects
American Investments in China, CHINA Bus. REv., May 1994, at 29, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Asapii File.
77. The FCPA provides no guidance as to subsidiary compliance or the minority U.S.
investors' liability. Id,
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will engage in corrupt practices.7' The Act defines "knowledge" as:
(1) awareness that one is engaging in illegal conduct, or that the cir-
cumstances exist; (2) a firm belief that such circumstance exists; and
(3) awareness of a high probability of the existence of such circum-
stance.7 9 Consequently, it seems that FCPA liability can accrue if ar-
rangements between the parent and the subsidiary are sufficiently
close, such that the U.S. parent either knows of or suspects a high
probability of improper conduct by the subsidiary!31
In addition to the uncertainties of FCPA liability which arise in
U.S. export sales and U.S.-China joint ventures, competition from
other countries' investments in China magnifies exposure to the
FCPA. Competition between U.S. businesses and their major foreign
competitors is fierce in certain areas, such as Chinese government pro-
curement projects81 The FCPA hampers U.S. companies' ability to
compete in China.' As a result, U.S. companies may be increasingly
exposed to the FCPA as they are forced to violate the Act in order to
compete. Interestingly, the growth of U.S. investment in China has
not caught up with the growth rate of total worldwide investment
there8 3
B. Rampant Corruption in the PRCs
The tide of corruption in China has also compounded the prob-
lem of FCPA exposure for U.S. companies. Ever since Deng Xiao
78. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), -2(a)(3).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2), (h)(3).
80. See Joy, supra note 22, at 694.
81. China-Trade Competition Overview, MARKET REP., Aug. 19, 1994, avatlrbk in
LEXIS, Itrade Library, Mktrpt File (figures supplied by the U.S. Embassy in Beijing illus-
trating U.S. market share of Chinese government procurement projects against Japan, Ger-
many, France, and Italy). Sources of competition cited in the report are technology, terms
of financing, and pricing. Id
82. Id The U.S. Embassy in Beijing also stated that "[t]he Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act is unique in the international business world. American companies are forbiddlan to
do what many companies routinely do to get contracts." Id.
83. The growth rate of total foreign investment in China has surged. China's utilized
direct investment grew to $11 billion in 1992, 160% over that of 1991. Direct investment
then quadrupled to reach nearly $58 billion in 1992. Congress . Economic Comn. Rep.,
supra note 64, at 118. However, growth in U.S. investments in China was lagging behind
other countries. U.S. direct investment in China only increased from $300 million to $500
million from 1990 to 1992. See Hearing on Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 65, at 53.
See also Congress . Economic Comm. Rep., supra note 64, at 118.
84. For a brief discussion of China's corruption problem, see Helena Kolenda, One
Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control
It, 4 J. CamN~sE L. 187 (1990), available in WL, Jchinl Database. The causes of China's
corruption include institutional (one-party rule), economic (part-planned and partn-market
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Ping made his famous remark that "it is glorious to get rich," govern-
ment and party officials alike "have taken the statement to heart."8' 5
As a growing number of Chinese officials exchange their connections
and influence for financial gain, the tide of corruption seems to be
uncontrollable.8 6 Some China watchers opine that corruption is al-
most "institutionalized" in the PRC,87 and "payoffs, kickbacks, graft
and bribery... have become a daily feature of doing business with
China."
88
Officials are reportedly soliciting bribes more often from foreign
businessmen negotiating for contracts in China.89 The request for
bribes has progressed from the taking of gifts to requesting kickbacks
based on a percentage of the sales commission or an outright demand
of money.9" Brewer Stone, who has written a book on corruption in
China, warned that U.S. businesses should not abruptly turn down
corrupt demands, for "it could lead to an army of inspectors arriving
at your workplace.., to search for and find every violation they can
imagine." 91
While most corruption in the PRC is clearly prohibited by the
FCPA as well as local laws, some "practices" are more nebulous and
may present dilemmas for those U.S. businesses eager to deal with
China. The following examples illustrate some gray areas:
economy), cultural (the concept of kinship, connections, and traditional gift-giving), and
psychological problems (the breakdown of public morality and the growing cynicism
toward the communist ideology).
85. 2.1 Reformers in Controk Looming Dangers, CmNA HAND, July 1, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, EIUCH File.
86. Id.
87. Stephen Hutcheon, The Great Crime of the People, AGE (Melbourne), Jan. 14,
1995, at 24, available in LEXIS, Reuters Textline, World Library, Txtlne File. "Corruption
comes in many guises in China. It is manifested in arbitrary levies on farmers and workers.
It comes in the shape of facilitation fees for services and favors, It's old-fashioned embez-
zlement, fraud and smuggling; it's using Government expenses to pay for private entertain-
ment; using public funds to buy an imported car; giving preferential treatment to friends
and relatives." Id.
88. Julia Leung, Greased Palms Lubricate Wheels in China, VALL ST. J., July 20, 1989,
at 10.
89. Daniel Southerland, Foreigners See Rise in Bribes in China, WAsH. PoST, Apr. 23,
1987, at Al. In 1987, a U.S. businessman told the Washington Post that the amount of the
bribe involved depends on the size of the contract. It can range from a few hundred dollars
to $10,000 initially, often with subsequent requests. Id.
90. Id. An American businessman said bribes often consist of "splitting a sales com-
mission with a Chinese official." A Japanese executive commented that children of high-
level cadres who were in a position to help foreigners obtain contracts "began asking
straight out for money." Id.
91. Brewer S. Stone, Manager's Journal. Beating China's Rapacious Profiteers, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 4, 1993, at A14.
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1. Payment to "improve sales" in China, such as paid "inspection
trips" for Chinese officials. By far the most common type of request
is a demand to pay for foreign travel so that Chinese officials can
ostensibly learn more about the foreign product.'  The FCPA al-
lows such inspection trips if "they are directly related to the promo-
tion, demonstration or explanation of products and services, or the
execution of a contract with a foreign government. 9 3 However,
unusually large per diems to Chinese officials may raise questions of
"reasonable" or "bona fide" expenditures under the Act.')
2. Request to sponsor the overseas education of trading officials'
children. 5 The FCPA most likely prohibits these requests when the
benefits are given quid pro quo to Chinese officials to obtain busi-
ness. However, if the sponsorship is given as a matter of good
will9 6 FCPA liability may not result.
3. Black market for import and export licenses.9 7 Import licenses
for chemical fertilizers9" and automobiles and export licenses for
China-made garments are regularly sold on the black market.' If
facilitating payments are made legally under Chinese law to secure
regular import and export licenses,"u those payments should be al-
92. See Corruption: Getting Tough Pays Off, Bus. INr'L CHINA, Jan. 11, 193. available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Buchin File.
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(2), -2(c)(2). See also DOJ Review Prccedure Release No.
83-1, 83-3, 85-1, in 3 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. (Business Laws. Inc. 719-20.722
(1995) (promotional tours for foreign officials from Singapore and France seem to pass
FCPA's muster when the trips were reasonably related to the demonstration and promo-
tion of U.S. products and the costs of travel, lodging, and meals are reasonable and
necessary).
94. See Coping with Corruptiorn The Darker Side of Trading with China, Bus. INt,'L
CHINA, Mar. 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Buchin File.
95. Foreign Companies Wrestle wit Continuing Problem of Corruption in China. Bus.
INur'i, July 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busins File.
96. In 1980 a U.S. law firm seeking to do business in a foreign country proposed to
establish a fund for the education and support of two adopted children of a foreign official.
The Department of Justice was asked to issue an opinion on this gesture. The DOJ de-
clined enforcement action, because no business had been obtained, and there %%s not
enough nexus between the proposed conduct and the preferential treatment to the law
firm. DOJ Review Procedure Release No. 80-01, in 3 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep.
(Business Laws, Inc.) 711 (1995).
97. Foreign Companies Wrestle with Continuing Problem of Corruption in China,
supra note 95.
98. Id. It is reported that the going black market price for a fertilizer import license
was between US $1 and US $1.50 per ton in 1989. In 1992, more than 25% of all U.S.
fertilizers exported were to China. Congress JL Economic Comm. Rep., supra note 64, at
118.
99. Coping With Corruption. The Darker Side of Trading with China, supra note 94.
100. The legality of grease payments for routine government actions under the FCPA is
controversial. Some SEC and DOJ members stated, during a workshop held by the Prac-
ticing Law Institute, that the legality of the payment under foreign law is irrelevant, how-
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lowed under the routine government action exception of the Act.
However, if licenses are transacted on the black market, the "rou-
tine government action" exception would not apply regardless of
how routinely the black market operates.
4. Bribery to push goods through customs and the Commodity In-
spection Bureau. 10 1 The customs in southern China reportedly re-
duce the dutiable value of imports by half if these officials are
"appropriately compensated."102 Moreover, certain inspection cer-
tificates, complete with signatures and seals, reportedly can be read-
ily purchased on the black market.' 0 3 The payment made to
facilitate the clearing of goods through customs is an enumerated
exception under the "routine government action" definition of the
Act.' 4 However, a disclosure question may arise for those U.S. is-
suers who also need to comply with the accounting provisions and
keep accurate records and books, if the pattern of making facilitat-
ing payments is so substantial and may "reflect on the conduct of
the business of the company."'
10 5
5. Splitting sales commissions and kickbacks."° Chinese officials
are often rewarded by foreign business people with fixed portions of
their sales commission if the officials could provide marketing infor-
mation and "guarantee" the sale.'0 7 Splitting a sales commission is
within the purview of the FCPA if an instrumentality of the U.S.
interstate commerce is used to obtain business. Since liability may
attach when the U.S. party has any knowledge that the sales com-
ever, the illegality of the payment under the foreign law would be relevant. Laura Carlson
Chen, Corporate Counsel's Primer on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in 1 Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act Rep. (Business Laws, Inc.) 101.021 (1995). See also The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, Bus. INr'L CHINA, Jan. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Buchin
File (caution must be exercised in paying facilitating money to secure "routine government
actions" such as bribes to obtain amenities or utilities, because if the payment causes an
official to "go beyond what the local law requires" in order for the official to do his routine
work, then there may be a possible violation of the FCPA).
101. Foreign Companies Wrestle with Continuing Problem of Corruption in China,
supra note 95. A seasoned Chinese trader stated that if one would "go to 10 different
customs ports and negotiate hard, [one] could get 10 different duty rates and 10 different
dutiable values." Id "A Japanese company that planned to bring heavy industrial equip-
ment into China-equipment that had met both Japanese and U.S. standards-were told
by CIB [Customs Inspection Bureau] officials that the machines would be dismantled on
arrival for inspection purposes. The problem was resolved only after the firm invited the
officials to visit Japan." Id.
102. Coping with Corruption: The Darker Side of Trading with China, supra note 94.
103. Id.
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A).
105. Chen, supra note 100, at 101.020-21.
106. Southerland, supra note 89, at Al.
107. Id.
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mission to a third party will be used to bribe a foreign official,1'C a
specific arrangement to split a sales commission with an official is
clearly an FCPA violation.
C. China's "Socialist Market Economy'" FCPA Pitfalls for U.S.
Businesses
Besides corruption, China's hybrid market and socialist economy
create plenty of FCPA pitfalls for U.S. businesses. First, China's crea-
tion of a part-planned and part-market economy has fueled corruption
ever since it embarked on its "socialist market economy" reforms ap-
proximately fifteen years ago.10 9 Because the central authorities still
control and regulate parts of the system, a "multiplicity of monopolies
and quotas" are created which encourage government corruption.1
The opportunities for government graft are indeed numerous in a vast
country that is controlled by one party with members set on exchang-
ing political prestige for economic power."'
Second, dangers lurk in the form of FCPA violations? behind
China's "socialist market economy," where seemingly private enter-
prises can still have government or party connections. Because the
Act's broad definition of "foreign official" includes "any officer or
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or in-
strumentality,"" 3 U.S. businesses may find difficulty in distinguishing
between an official and a nonofficial in a socialist state such as
China.
114
Although the FCPA does not define an "agency" or "instrumen-
tality" of a foreign government, the definition can be quite broad. By
way of reference, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act defines an
"'agency" or "instrumentality" as a commercial enterprise a majority
108. In one of its Review Procedure Releases, the DOJ declined to take enforcement
action when the requesting U.S. company obtained a written certificate signed by a third-
party marketing organization warranting that it would not use the 10% sales commission of
military patrol boats for any purpose which would violate the FCPA. DOJ Review Proce-
dure Release No. 87-1, in 1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. (Business Laws, Inc.) 724
(1995).
109. The "socialist market economy" was recently reaffirmed by the Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party in November 1993. James D. Zirin, Market and the Rule of
Lav, FORBEs, Sept. 12, 1994, at 114.
110. Hutcheon, supra note 87.
111. 2.1 Reformers in Control, supra note 85 (China's political and economic stability
threatened by economic overheating, rural unrest, and party corruption).
112. Givant, supra note 76.
113. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(1), -2(h)(2).
114. Givant, supra note 76.
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of whose shares are owned by a foreign government.11 Although the
issue of what constitutes a "foreign official" under the FCPA has not
been litigated in the United States, a British court has interpreted the
term "foreign official" under the FCPA to include private contractors
who made bids for federal housing repairs.
116
In China, many "private" enterprises may still have strong ties
with the local authorities or the Communist Party, despite efforts over
the last decade to privatize State-owned enterprises. By way of illus-
tration, China's current efforts to restructure state-owned enterprises
into companies limited by private shares will not help U.S. businesses
clear up this confusion. U.S. businesses are confused about the status
of these "privatized" companies because the State often retains at
least 50% ownership of the restructured industries, and the "govern-
ment and party officials still appoint the management of these restruc-
tured firms.""' 7  The language of the FCPA and the broad
interpretation of its terms by most courts may effectively make most
Chinese traders fall within the definition of "the agent or instrumen-
tality of a foreign official."
In addition, China's socialist market economy also led to a pleth-
ora of laws and regulations l18 which encourage corruption and in-
crease the possibility of FCPA exposure. Contrary to the popular
belief that China lacks a legal framework, the PRC apparently has
adequate laws, but seems to inadequately enforce those laws. 1 9 The
lack of effective law enforcement in China essentially means that
either the authorities have too much discretion or people are able to
beat the system through corrupt practices.' 20 This kind of business
environment enhances the potential for liability under the FCPA.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), (b) (1994).
116. In United States v. Griffin, a private contractor was "a public official" held to be
acting "for and on behalf of" the Federal Government because contractors were given
discretion by the Federal Housing Authority with respect to bids and housing repairs. 401
F. Supp. 1022 (S.D. Ind. 1975). In a British case which cited United States v. Griffin exten-
sively, the court ruled that a person in a position to specify and recommend the use of
equipment for the purpose of a foreign government's construction project is deemed to act
as a "foreign official" for the purposes of the FCPA. Ali and Another v. Carrier Trans-
continental Co. Ltd. (1989), quoted in Rachel Davies, Commission Contract Contravenes
U.S. Law, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1989, at 41.
117. Givant, supra note 76.
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IV. Minimizing Exposure to the FCPA
Despite the potential FCPA problems faced by U.S. businesses in
China, effective measures may be implemented to protect U.S. enti-
ties. First, U.S. corporations may formulate FCPA compliance meas-
ures which will offer protection from FCPA exposure. Second, U.S.
parties may employ certain practical tactics, which have proven to
work for U.S. businesses in their dealings with China, as measures for
protection against FCPA liability.
A. Formulating FCPA Compliance Measures2
FCPA compliance measures may be effectuated on several levels.
They include: (1) adopting internal measures, (2) implementing due
diligence procedures, (3) structuring agreements, and (4) enlisting
help from the U.S. government such as using the DOJ Opinion
Procedure.122
1. Adopting Internal Measures
U.S. businesses may implement internal measures to monitor
themselves, their subsidiaries, or joint venture operations for corrup-
tion and accounting irregularities. Such internal measures should be
implemented vigorously.123 Internal measures could include institut-
ing internal corporate training; written policies for employees, agents,
and or joint venture partners; procedures for reporting and investiga-
tion; and seeking the opinion of counsel.
a. Training All Officers and Employees
The first step in instituting effective internal procedures should be
to provide training to all officers and employees, especially marketing
and accounting personnel who are involved in foreign operations. In-
ternal training such as formal discussions and materials on the FCPA
provisions should be well documented to provide evidence later on, in
case they are needed. 4 In particular, copies of the Act should be
121. For a detailed description of a general corporate compliance program %,hich
includes hypothetical questions, see Chen, supra note 100, at 101.001, 101.053-072.
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(e), -2(0. The opinion procedure itself is codified at 28 C.F.R.
§§ 80.1-.16 (1995).
123. The DOJ takes this view seriously. In one of its Review Procedure Releases, the
DOJ stated that merely having a contract full of warranties and references to the FCPA is
not sufficient without affirmative precautionary steps. DOJ Review Procedure Release
No. 80-03, in 3 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. (Business Laws, Inc.) 712 (1995).
124. Chen, supra note 100, at 101.053-54.
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circulated widely to the employees, and annual certifications should
be obtained from auditors or controllers stating that they understand
the Act and will abide by it.125
A crucial part of internal training is to provide clues for recogniz-
ing warning signs, or "red flags," which may lead to FCPA expo-
sure.'26 Some typical red flags include unusually high commissions,
payments to parties who do not render substantial services, payments
to third parties, the reputation of the foreign agent, the agent's rela-
tionship with the foreign government, and the reputation of industries
notorious for publicized bribes.127 The SEC also has indicated some
red flag situations which would increase the likelihood of prosecution:
size of payment, size of transaction, and past conduct of the parties. 128
In China's case, if certain government authorities or industries are no-
table for generating bribery problems, alternate sales channels should
be sought. They involve not only avoiding selling directly and using a
foreign distributor in a third country for a resale, but also requesting
that the foreign distributor warrant they will not violate the FCPA.
129
b. Implementing Written Policy
To supplement in-house training, U.S. companies with activities
in China may consider adopting a written company policy (i.e., a pol-
icy statement which sets out in concrete terms the acceptable and pro-
hibited behaviors). The policy statement should specifically note the
kinds of prohibited payments and recipients under the Act, and under
what circumstances an internal investigation would be conducted.' "
Some corporations find the establishment of an ethics code to be
an important part of their written company policy.131 In China, some
125. Ia at 101.054-55.
126. Glenn A. Pitman & James P. Sanford, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Revisited:
Attempting to Regulate "Ethical Bribes" in Global Business, 30 INT'L J. PURCHASINO &
MATERIALS MGMIT. 15 (1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, Asapii File. See also
Chen, supra note 100, at 101.054-55; Pendergast, supra note 8, at 102.016.
127. Pitman & Sanford, supra note 126.
128. Statement of Comm'n Policy, Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 17099,
1980 SEC LEXIS 820, at *15 (Aug. 28, 1980).
129. A similar strategy was proposed by a boatyard which was trying to sell military
patrol boats to the Nigerian government through a United Kingdom-incorporated com-
pany. The DOJ approved that strategy. See DOJ Review Procedure Release No. 87-1, In 3
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. (Business Laws, Inc.) 724 (1995).
130. See Chen, supra note 100, at 101.055.
131. Since the adoption of the FCPA, 85% of the 2000 largest U.S. companies have
created a written internal code of ethics which provides managers with guidelines. Pitman
& Sanford, supra note 126.
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U.S. multinational corporations such as Coca-Cola have written the
FCPA into their code of conduct, and provide Chinese translations to
all their partners and employees in mainland China.' -  Apart from a
general code of ethics, U.S. employees who have dealings in the PRC
should be fully briefed on Chinese ethical behavior such as Chinese
customs and laws before entering China. This is necessary to under-
stand and correctly interpret appropriate behavior.
1 -3
c. Instituting Procedures for Reporting and Investigation
Companies with complex structures should designate a specific
individual to monitor FCPA compliance in each major subsidiary or
division. Frequently this task falls on either senior executives, coun-
sel, or auditors. Corporate in-house or outside special counsel are
also frequently used in investigation, although opinions differ as to
which is better.1' In any event, involvement of a lawyer is required if
a U.S. company wishes to take advantage of attorney-client privilege
protection.13 - Besides lawyers, auditors are also crucial in administer-
ing internal FCPA compliance and investigations. In the event that
the U.S. party does not have its own internal auditing staff to conduct
site inspections, the party should employ outside auditors.Y"
Lastly, monitoring and auditing procedures and systems should
be individually tailored to the scope of business operations. There is
considerable leeway in selecting the system which the management
feels is the most suitable for the company.13 7  More importantly,
132. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 100. A sample code of ethics %hich
contains references to the FCPA is printed in United Technologies' Code of Ethics, in 3
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. (Business Laws. Inc.) 1573-83 (1995).
133. Impert, supra note 12, at 1022.
134. For a detailed discussion of corporate in-house reporting, auditing, and investiga-
tions, see Robert J. Gareis, Avoiding Corporate Catastrophes-The Conduct and Straregtes
of Internal Corporate Investigations, and Analysis of the Duty to Report Corporate Investi-
gations, in 1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. (Business Laws, Inc.) 102.001 (1995).
135. See Pendergast, supra note 8, at 102.016
136. In several of the DOJ Review Procedure Releases, the requesting U.S. parties
used auditing, or the right to inspect books, to monitor their overseas operations. Sce, e.g.,
DOJ Review Procedure Release No. 84-2, in 3 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. (Busi-
ness Laws, Inc.) 722 (1995); see also DOJ Review Procedure Release No. 86-1, wn 3 Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Rep. (Business Laws, Inc.) 723 (1995) (U.S. corporation %vhich re-
tained a member of the Malaysian legislature to act as its representative to purchase and
sell commodities undertook to keep detailed records of expenditure and the right to review
records in each business venture or relationship).
137. See Chen, supra note 100, at 101.056-57. See also SEC Chairman Address, supra
note 34, at 11546-47. SEC Chairman Harold Williams stated that the SEC would not sec-
ond-guess the internal control procedures which management uses. Id.
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whichever internal monitoring and auditing systems are selected, they
should manifest the objectives of effective internal control under the
FCPA. 38
d. Seeking Counsel Opinion
Parts of the FCPA involve considerable interplay with foreign
law. Therefore, a company should at least seek the opinion of counsel
on local laws. For instance, the Act forbids payments to cause a viola-
tion of a foreign official's "lawful duty."'1 39 In addition, the Act pro-
vides an affirmative defense which makes the payments legal if they
are lawful under the written laws of a foreign country. 14  Conse-
quently, it may be prudent to seek the opinion of counsel on the appli-
cable law of the PRC before engaging any foreign employee, partner,
director, or agent in any dealings.
14 1
When negotiating for sales agents, obtaining the opinion of coun-
sel on the legality of foreign law is recommended in evaluating the
terms of a sales agreement. The evaluation should consider the legal-
ity of the method, place of payment, and any splitting of commissions
under local law.' 42 In the PRC or other countries with currency con-
trols, the method and place of payment may involve a series of foreign
laws and regulations.
2. Due-Diligence
a. Selecting Joint Venture Partners or Sales Agents
Internal measures are adequate to minimize FCPA exposure only
to the extent of a U.S. company's own involvement. However, due
diligence in selecting the foreign partner or sales agent may offer
more protection for the foreign operation or subsidiary. Due dili-
gence should involve a thorough and well-documented investigation
of the background and reputation of prospective Chinese partners or
agents to discover if they are prone to corrupt practices. For example,
one U.S. company which spent up to two years scouting for a reliable
138. SEC Chairman Address, supra note 34, at 11546-47.
139. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3)(A), -2(a)(2)(A).
140. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b)-(c), -2(b)-(c). However, no country would permit bribery
under written laws. Pendergast, supra note 8, at 102.004.
141. See DOJ Review Release No. 88-1, in 3 Foreign Practices Rep. (Business Laws,
Inc.) 725 (1995) (U.S. party sought the opinion of Mexican counsel on the legality of pay-
ment of fees to the Mexican government under Mexican law).
142. Chen, supra note 100, at 101.060. Foreign counsel's opinion was consulted in sev-
eral of the DOJ's "no-enforcement action" Review Releases. See, e.g., DOJ Review Re-
lease No. 88-1, supra note 141.
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and honest partner to operate a U.S. fast-food chain in Beijing re-
ported that "the patience paid off" in terms of avoiding FCPA
liability.
143
Foreign sales agents or partners should be chosen on the basis of
merit. For instance, in an application for a foreign agent, the candi-
date should set forth relevant business information, family or business
ties to government officials, or prior positions held in government.'"
The decision to appoint a particular foreign agent should demonstrate
a bona fide business reason for the appointment,145 which should be
based on: (1) the candidate's character and background,""6 (2) inter-
view results, (3) results from reference checks, (4) the agent's history,
(5) potential third party beneficiaries to the appointment, (6) the
number of years in business and successes in the industry, and (7) the
qualifications of the agent's staff.1 47 The corporate internal procedure
for evaluating candidates should be well documented. Those respon-
sible for the appointment's review and approval should be
specified.' 4s
b. Disclosure of Business Relationships and Accounting
Irregularities
Disclosure always suggests precaution but also will help to deter-
mine whether knowledge of third party bribes is present if illegal pay-
ments are later discovered. 49 Once a foreign agent has been selected,
the intended customers as well as the foreign government should be
formally notified, so that the appointment and any limitations in the
143. Corruption: Getting Tough Pays Off, supra note 92 (Kentucky Fried Chicken spent
two years looking for a reliable Chinese partner to operate its first store in Beijing). Many
U.S. businessmen contend that it always pays to expend resources and time to find a relia-
ble, honest, and business-savvy Chinese partner. See Ettore, supra note 69, at 20.
144. Impert, supra note 12, at 1018.
145. Id.
146. Candidate backgrounds. such as the absence of any prohibited government rela-
tionship, can sometimes be confirmed by the United States consulate. Id.
147. The DOJ has approved similar due diligence measures in a U.S.-Philippine busi-
ness arrangement and in the appointment of a foreign firm as a marketing representative
for a U.S. company. See e.g., DOJ Review Procedure Release No. 81-1 (DOJ review pro-
cedure release issued for Bechtel and SGV Group), and No. 84-4 (DOJ review procedure
release issued for an unidentified U.S. company in its appointment of a foreign marketing
agent), both in 3 Foreign Practices Rep. (Business Laws, Inc.) 713-15, 721 (1995).
148. Impert, supra note 12, at 1018.
149. Id. at 1019.
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scope of the agency appointment can be made known.'5 ° The business
should also disclose factors which may suggest the possibility of brib-
ery, such as family or business ties with government officials.151
Disclosures should be made in accordance with the accounting
provision. A former SEC chief accountant suggested that auditors
publicly report any material inadequacies found in a company's inter-
nal controls.'52 Disclosure of accounting irregularities should be made
taking into consideration the three prevalent problems highlighted
when the Act was enacted: (1) some transactions were not recorded;
(2) some records were falsified to disguise some aspect of transaction;
and (3) some records were entered correctly, but there was a qualita-
tive misrepresentation.
53
3. Structuring Agreements to Minimize FCPA Exposure
Business agreements should provide for the inclusion of repre-
sentations and warranties with regard to the FCPA.154 For instance,
letters of intent and joint venture contracts should state that the Chi-
nese party or agent partner has been notified of the FCPA and under-
takes not to bribe officials or act in any way which would violate the
Act.' -5  Moreover, the U.S. party may want to make FCPA compli-
ance a condition precedent to signing any contract. Agreements to
appoint sales agents should contain a provision stating that the sales
agent is an independent contractor who is not an employee or instru-
mentality of any government or political party and has no authority to
bind the U.S. exporter.'56
More importantly, an agreement should be executed contingent
upon FCPA compliance by including provisions which will allow
150. Id. This disclosure measure is useful if an illicit payment is later proved. The fact
that the relationship is open may rebut the knowledge of bribery. Secrecy in the relation-
ship may intimate a U.S. company's knowledge of the bribe. Id.
151. Id. at 1018.
152. Matthew Schifrin, Bible Bungle: Auditors Had to Have Known About Zondervan's
Inadequate Financial Controls Nearly a Year Before the Write-offs, FoRBES, Mar. 11, 1985,
at 123.
153. Chen, supra note 100, at 101.003.
154. Impert, supra note 12, at 1018. See, e.g., DOJ Review Procedure Releases No. 81-1
and 84-4, supra note 147, at 713-15, 721 (DOJ review procedure release issued for Bechtel
and SGV Group) and (DOJ review procedure release issued for an unidentified U.S. com-
pany in its appointment of a foreign marketing agent). In both releases, the business con-
tracts contain representations from the foreign partner or agent that they will not pay
anything of value to any public official in the foreign country for the purpose of influencing
the official's acts. Id.
155. Impert, supra note 12, at 1019.
156. Id. at 1018-19.
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either party to be excused of performance or empowered to terminate
the agreement if either party acts in violation of the FCPA.1 7 To af-
ford stronger protection for the U.S. party, an agreement should in-
clude an indemnification clause. The clause should provide that if the
foreign party violates the FCPA, that party will indemnify the U.S.
party for damages incurred as a result of the violation.' 3 For in-
stance, in U.S.-China joint venture contracts, provisions may be in-
cluded such that the Chinese party shall undertake to buy back shares
or ownership interest at an agreed price if the American partner with-
draws because of possible FCPA liability.15 9
4. Utilizing U.S. Government Resources
In accordance with the FCPA, it is possible for a company con-
cerned about a contemplated transaction to get an opinion from the
DOJ in order to determine the legitimacy of that transaction.1L9 All
DOJ-approved transactions carry a presumption of innocence with re-
spect to DOJ enforcement.' 61 The Attorney General requires that the
information furnished be "complete" and "accurate" before the DOJ
may properly issue an opinion, and the party submitting the opinion
request must be a party to the proposed transaction.'" 2 In addition,
the request must be regarding an actual, not a hypothetical, transac-
tion and must be made prior to the requester's commitment to pro-
ceed with the transaction. 63 Documents submitted with any request
for an opinion are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of In-
formation Act.16 Although not frequently used by U.S. compa-
157. Id. at 1019. See, e.g., DOJ Review Procedure Release Nos. 81-1 and S,-4, supra
note 147, at 713-15, 721.
158. See, e.g., DOJ Review Release Nos. 81-1 and 84-4, supra note 147, at 713-15,721.
159. Interview with Sharon Hartline, partner at White & Case, in Hong Kong (Jan. 9,
1995) (on file with the author).
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(e), -2(0. The opinion procedure itself is codified at 28 CF.R
§ 80.1-.16 (1995). A useful summary is described by William F. Pendergast. See Pendar-
gast, supra note 8, at 102.011-.012.
161. A "no enforcement action" opinion issued by the DOJ only gives ris2 to a pre-
sumption of conformity with the FCPA. This presumption may be rebutted by evidene.
that information submitted with the opinion request was not complete and accurate, or
that the actual conduct was not the one described in the opinion request. 28 CF.R. § 80.10
(1995).
162. 28 C.F.R. § 80.4 (1995).
163. 28 C.F.R. § 80.3 (1995).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(e)(2), -2(0(2); 28 C.F.RI § S,.14(a)
(1995).
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nies,'65 this procedure is a powerful way of demonstrating due
diligence and FCPA compliance.
Other U.S. government departments or agencies such as the De-
partment of Commerce, the Department of State, and the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA) may also render information and support to
assist corporations in their FCPA compliance efforts. For instance, the
Clinton Administration has received commendations from U.S. busi-
nesses for its willingness to intercede for companies who may lose
business abroad because of refusals to pay bribes. 166 The CIA also
offers help by collecting "economic intelligence."' 167 The CIA
monitors U.S. competitors' corrupt practices which affect U.S. busi-
nesses. The CIA then relays the information to the President and the
State and Commerce Departments so that they may pressure foreign
governments to abandon their corrupt practices. 168
B. Practical Strategies for U.S. Parties in the PRC
As a matter of long-term business strategy, U.S. parties with ac-
tivities in the PRC may consider practical tactics to shield themselves
from corrupt practices in China. In China, it is not unheard of for
executed contracts to be opened for renegotiation, 169 and once busi-
nesses start the bribing cycle, more bribes will be necessary to feed the
growing appetite of some corrupt officials.170  Consequently, U.S.
companies should deploy practical strategies to handle some custom-
ary practices in the PRC.
1. Negotiation Tactics
The following tactics may help U.S. companies avoid FCPA com-
pliance problems while transacting business in the PRC.
165. Since the enactment of the FCPA, there have been about 25 requests from the
DOJ to issue a pretransaction opinion. Pendergast, supra note 8, at 102.011.
166. Ettore, supra note 69.
167. David E. Sanger. How Washington Inc. Makes a Sale, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1995, at
1.
168. let
169. David Schlesinger, China Watchers Now Worry if Gain Worth the Risks, REUTERS,
Nov. 28, 1994, at 28, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Reuapb File.
170. One report of a lesson learned from bribing Chinese officials contends that "fo]nce
hidden cost is accepted, it will re-occur [sic]. Every payment is a precedent for the next."
Corruption: Getting Tough Pays Off, supra note 92. See also Southerland, supra note 89.
A Japanese businessman observed that in the past, the gift of a television or a video would
be enough. However, corrupt officials later started asking outright for money. Id.
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(a) Make it clear up front that the company does not give
bribes.17' A prominent U.S. clothes manufacturing chain reported
that it was able to obtain the export licenses for their garments legally
by standing firm in its refusal to pay bribes.""-
(b) Use the FCPA as leverage to rebuff corrupt demands. 73 Sev-
eral U.S. multinational companies, including beverage and toiletries
manufacturers1 74 and fast-food chains, 175 reported success in using this
tactic. However, a company's ability to face down demands varies
greatly with the nature of the business and the reputation of the com-
pany.176 Those businesses depending on irregular, high-value deals or
companies with a less prominent profile may understandably have less
leverage. However, they may consider joining forces to refuse Chi-
nese corrupt demands.' 77
(c) Make use of "legal bribery" instead of "monetary bribery."
"Legal bribery" is offering benefits such as information on new tech-
nologies, prestige, recognition, or donations to local charities. This
may be more effective than succumbing to corrupt requests for mone-
tary rewards. 178
(d) Join with other firms to present a "united front" to face com-
mon grafts. Several U.S. communications firms 7" reported success
with this tactic in reducing demands for kickbacks from Chinese jour-
nalists. The drawback of this method is that it works best onl, when
the companies are important players in the industry.
2. Avoidance of False Assumptions
U.S. companies should be aware that Chinese parties frequently
bluff and are just "trying it on.' ' s O For example, an American corpo-
171. Ettore, supra note 69.
172. Impert, supra note 12, at 1021.
173. Id; see also Corruption: Getting Tough Pays Off, supra note 92.
174. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 100 (Colgate-Palmolive, and Coca-
Cola reported that they were able to rebuff corrupt demands by using the FCPA as
leverage).
175. Corruption: Getting Tough Pays Off; supra note 92 (Kentucky Fried Chicken rene-
gotiated contracts with top Chinese managers, but still cut their previously liberal foreign
travel allowances by offering business incentives).
176. Id. "The corporate communications firms of Hill and Knowlton, Burson-Marstel-
ler and InterAsia Communications ... agreed on a joint policy aimed at curbing extortion
requests from mainland journalists." ld.
177. Id
178. Pitman & Sanford, supra note 126.
179. Stone, supra note 91, at Al.
180. Corruption: Getting Tough Pays Qff, supra note 92.
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rate investigator reported that a $100,000 bribery demand was
dropped after a Chinese manager "laughed in disgust" for a few min-
utes.181 However, U.S. parties should realize that in being firm they
are inviting frustration, the risk of deals falling through, or even
threats to keep silent about the bribery requests. 182
3. Knowledge of PRC Law
U.S. companies should be briefed on the laws of the PRC, espe-
cially the anticorruption laws, customs laws, tax laws, currency control
regulations, and other regulations which restrict foreign business ac-
tivity.1' 3 China's anticorruption laws, ironically, are more stringent
and their penalties are far more severe than those of the FCPA.184
The anticorruption laws are found throughout China's Criminal Law
of 1979, the 1988 Supplementary Provisions to the 1979 law, and other
National People's Congress decisions."8
4. Reliable Chinese Business Partners
It is well worth the effort to expend more resources and time up
front to find a reliable, honest, and business-savvy Chinese partner.
Securing dependable Chinese partners helps in two ways. First, the
quality of the Chinese partner is crucial to controlling "hidden costs"
or questionable payments, because demands for bribery will reoccur
once bribes are offered.8 6 Second, dependable partners provide valu-
able insight, information, and experience which can be instrumental to
U.S. businesses in helping them to avoid costly mistakes.
87
181. Id.
182. A PRC Foreign Trade Corporation Official once demanded a 3% kickback from a
U.S. firm which bid on a large sale. When the company refused, it not only lost the deal,
but it also was threatened not to say a word about the bribe to anyone. Coping With
Corruption: The Darker Side of Trading With China, supra note 94.
183. Impert, supra note 12, at 1019.
184. In China, convictions for bribery and corruption can carry the death penalty. See
Daniel Kwan, Criminals and Corrupt Cadres Face "No Mercy", S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 14, 1995, at 8, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, SChina File. In 1994, China exe-
cuted 150 people for corruption. Susan Lim, Corruption: Can It Be Stamped Out?, Tir
STRArr TimEs (Singapore), Oct. 8, 1995, (Sunday Review), at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Strait File.
185. See Kolenda, supra note 84, at 187.
186. Corruption: Getting Tough Pays Off, supra note 92.
187. Pitman & Sanford, supra note 126.
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5. Clean Company Image
A company with a reputation for high ethical standards may be
able to stave off corrupt or unreasonable demands. Unfortunately,
only the larger, high-profile companies will normally be successful us-
ing this tactic.'88
V. Conclusion
U.S. entities are increasingly exposed to FCPA liability in the
People's Republic of China. Chinese parties expose U.S. entities to
various kinds of corrupt practices and extortion. Structural factors
such as the popular joint venture arrangement for foreign investment
and China's part-planned/part-market economy compound the prob-
lem of FCPA compliance for U.S. businesses in China.
Despite these problems, there are effective internal measures
U.S. businesses can implement to protect themselves from exposure to
the FCPA. In addition, practical business strategies may be effective
in combating the adverse business environment in the PRC. U.S.
companies need to stand firm in order to rebuff Chinese corrupt prac-
tices so that they can minimize FCPA exposure.
The existence of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act means that
U.S. businesses involved in international business transactions will in-
evitably find themselves caught in the difficult task of ironing out the
discrepancies between the U.S. legal framework and the customary
practices of many developing countries, of which China is a prime ex-
ample. In a world where economies are moving closer together, U.S.
companies need to be increasingly resourceful and creative in bridging
these discrepancies which may produce harsh results for the unwary.
188. Corruption" Getting Tough Pays Off, supra note 92.
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